We present a model of political campaigning where a candidate chooses between promoting oneself (positive campaign) or attacking the rival (negative campaign). The media validates the claims made by candidates, and the quality of a candidate is not revealed unless there is a debate about her suitability, i.e. she is the subject of both a positive and a negative campaign. Negative campaigns may be used either to expose the rival candidate (informative role) or to turn attention away from oneself (non-informative role). Our model suggests that in order to ascertain the e¤ect of negative advertising, studies should take into account the pro…le of messages (i.e. messages employed by both candidates) rather than the individual message in isolation. Voter expectation about candidate quality plays a major role in campaign selection: while the incidence of negative campaigning goes down as the expected prior improves, the probability of selection of the correct candidate is non-monotonic in the said prior.
Introduction
Electoral campaigns are possibly the most important element of voters' information about the candidates. However, campaigns do not contain disinterested, impartial information. Candidates choose their rhetoric strategically in order to in ‡uence voter perception. One aspect of such strategic choice that has received considerable attention both in the media and in the academy is the choice between positive and negative advertising: whether to highlight one's own quality or to focus on why the rival is unsuitable for o¢ ce. While every electoral campaign involves a I thank David Austen-Smith, Allen Brierly, Steve Callander, Joyee Deb, Alexandre Debs, Tim Feddersen, YukFai Fong, Sean Gailmard, Bard Harstad, Jaehoon Kim, Tapas Kundu, Marciano Siniscalchi, seminar participants at MPSA conference (2006), Michigan State University and CIDE, Mexico for comments and suggestions. I also acknowledge the hospitality and …nancial support from Wallis Institute of Political Economy, University of Rochester that I enjoyed while preparing part of the manuscript. Any error that remains in the paper is my responsibility.
large number of positive, negative and (especially) comparative messages, we shall characterize the overall theme of a campaign as broadly positive or negative, and it is the choice of this theme that we shall examine in this paper.
Opinions are deeply divided regarding whether the practice of negative campaigning improves or degrades the electoral process. While some view negative campaigns as essentially vicious mudslinging with the e¤ect of reducing turnout (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995, Ansolabehere et al 1994 Ansolabehere et al , 1999 , destroying voters'trust in government and undermining the e¢ cacy of the political system (Brader 2005) , others (Geer 2006 ) have pointed out its role in providing genuine information and disciplining the candidates, and even in stimulating turnout (Freedman and Goldstein 1999 , 2002 , Finkel and Geer 1998 , Kahn and Kenney 1999 , Wattenberg and Brians 1999 . While it is generally agreed that attack ads hurt both the source and the sponsor, scholars have disagreed over which e¤ect is larger. Over the last two decades, there has been a profusion of empirical and experimental research examining these e¤ects. However, in a meta-study covering 110 articles, dissertations and books published on the topic between 1987 and 2007, Lau et al (2007) …nds that there is equal support in the literature for each opposing hypothesis, and conclude that "there is no consistent evidence in the research literature that negative political campaigning "works" in the way the attackers desire" (Lau et al 2007 (Lau et al , page 1185 . 1 This leaves open the question why in the …rst place rational candidates employ such tactics. The object of this paper is threefold. First, we point out that an exclusive characterization of such mutually exclusive characterization of negative advertising as either always informative and therefore valuable or always uninformative and therefore undesirable is too much of an oversimpli…cation. 2 Negative advertising (just like positive advertising) can have both bene…cial and harmful roles, and we posit a formal model of issue choice in political campaigns that identi…es conditions under which one or the other obtains, and how the two roles interact. Second, we posit that information revelation in an electoral race depends crucially on the interaction of the two candidates'campaign messages. The e¤ect of a negative campaign may depend crucially on whether it is faced with a positive or a negative campaign. All empirical or experimental work aimed at uncovering the role of negativity in advertising has so far looked at the e¤ect of individual messages in isolation -we suggest that we may get a clearer picture if future work takes into account both the messages in contention. Third, existing theoretical work treats both negative and positive campaigns symmetrically. We point out a very important distinction between positive and negative advertising: while a candidate knows about his own quality, he may or may not know the quality of the rival. This means that by and large, the information content in positive campaigns is higher than that of negative campaigns.
We set up a very simple model in order to capture the above features and then derive implications for candidate selection. We present a novel channel through which the motivation to go positive or negative works: that of creating or avoiding focality. Since a negative campaign is used to focus the spotlight on the rival candidate -it may be motivated either by a desire to reveal information about the rival candidate or to conceal information about oneself, and crucially, its e¤ectiveness depends on whether or not the rival can successfully defend himself through a positive message.
We model the electoral race as a public debate where each candidate makes claims either about himself or his rival, and the media checks the veracity of those claims. The role of the campaign is thus setting the agenda for the media to focus on. Following the earlier literature, we ignore the dynamic aspect of campaigns where a candidate make counter-claims in response to the rival's claims. We make the simplifying assumption that a candidate commits to either a positive or a negative campaign in the beginning of the electoral race. 3 A positive campaign is a set of arguments why a candidate is suitable for o¢ ce and a negative campaign is a set of claims why the rival is unsuitable. Voters care only about the quality of the candidates and not the rhetoric per se. The role of the media is to produce a judgement on the quality of the candidate(s) that is the target of a campaign. The media is better able to produce such a judgement if it can compare claims and counter-claims about the candidate. 4 As long as the media is faced with only one-sided claims about a candidate, it cannot determine his quality for certain. In our benchmark case, we assume a deterministic information revelation protocol: the media can verify the true quality of a candidate if he is focal, i.e. if he sponsors a positive campaign and the rival sponsors a negative campaign. Otherwise, the media cannot unearth the quality of a candidate. In a latter extension, we assume a probabilistic information revelation protocol: the media can reveal the true quality of the focal candidate with a higher probability than that of the non-focal candiate. Voters vote based on information revealed through the protocol under consideration. In the model, a candidate may be either of "good" or of "bad" quality. If a good candidate is facing a bad candidate (and if they know each other's types), the former would prefer that either candidate be focal while the latter would prefer that neither is focal. This means that the two candidates have opposite preferences over message pro…les: the good candidate prefers to go positive (negative) when the bad candidate goes negative (positive), and the bad candidate prefers to go positive (negative) when the good candidate goes positive (negative), leading to a matching pennies game between the good and bad types. Since the bad candidate wants to hide (conceal information) and the good candidate wants to chase (reveal information), we title the competitive process of information provision as a Hide and Seek game. Geer (2006) , in his detailed historical study of American Presidential campaigns, informally makes an argument similar in spirit to what has been modeled in this paper. While positive campaigns allow candidates to "talk past each other" and voters would "assume innocence unless proved guilty", negative campaigns carry the risk of being caught "making unsubstantiated charges" (Geer, 2006 ; page 51). We allow, in addition, the possibility that even negative campaigns, when carried on by both sides, may not reveal much information either.
To make the sequence of events in the model clear, candidates are initially uninformed about each other's quality, and voters are uninformed about the candidates. All voters have the same preference, and in the benchmark model, a candidate may be either of good quality or of bad quality. Candidates have two actions: …rst they have an option to privately invest in acquiring information about their rival, and then they use their information to launch a political campaign. Campaign themes are chosen simultaneously, and the choice set is restricted to positive and negative campaigns. Finally, voters vote according to the information revealed through the debate.
The introduction of uncertainty between candidates and the option of costly search is a crucial innovation in this paper. While it is true that candidates know a great deal more about each other than most voters, such knowledge comes through a process of learning: we take a step back and incorporate this act of learning about the rival formally in the model as a costly option for a candidate. Between-candidate uncertainty captures a fundamental asymmetry between positive and negative campaigns that cannot be obtained in models which start out assuming that candidates know about each others'type (e.g. Polborn and Yi (2006)). While information used in a positive campaign is free for a candidate, truth in a negative campaign is costly to him. As a consequence, positive campaigns contain more information than negative campaigns. The innovation of twolayered incomplete information also allows us to explicitly distinguish between truthful negative campaigns which are bene…cial for the voter and false attacks or slander which are not. Slander in this framework is an uninformed attack on a good candidate, and our model predicts that such slander is always perpetrated by a bad candidate.
Earlier formal work on choice of message (Skaperdas and Grofman 1995, Harrington and Hess 1996) takes as primitive an "in ‡uence function" that assumes that negative advertising reduces support both for its sponsor and target. 5 In the current paper, these e¤ects arise in equilibrium.
Polborn and Yi (2006) studies a model of rhetoric choice with rational voter inference, but in that model, only informative advertising is considered.
6 5 Desposato (2008) studies the incidence of negative advertising in Latin American countires in a comparative perspective by using similar in ‡uence functions, but the outcome on voting probabilities is random. 6 Mattes (2008) is a similar model with choice between informative advertising on two dimensions: negative vs. positive and issue vs. character.
Main Results
Because of incomplete information between candidates, the prior belief of a candidate being good plays a major role in determining the nature of debate. Using this prior as a proxy for average (expected) candidate quality, we focus on understanding the strategic behavior of candidates as a function of this average (expected) candidate quality and the welfare implications of such behavior. The model con…rms the conventional wisdom that the incidence of negative advertising and slander increase as the average quality worsens. However, the hide-and-seek nature of the race provides an advantage to the "rarer" type. In particular, a good candidate can most e¤ectively reveal his type through positive advertising when the average candidate quality is low and there is a lot of negative campaigning. At the other extreme, when the average candidate quality is very high, all candidates engage in more positive campaigning: but this allows the bad candidates to e¤ectively "hide" by avoiding debate with the good types. Thus, while an electorate with low expected candidate quality is competitive but e¢ cient for the purpose of candidate selection, one with a high average quality is ine¢ cient. Consequently, voter welfare in terms of the ex-post expected quality of the winning candidate may actually go down with an increase in the ex-ante expected candidate quality.
The model also allows us to talk about a novel role of campaign resources. The role of campaign resources in in ‡uencing the voter's decision has been studied (see Snyder 1989 for example), this paper examines the role of campaign resources in …nding information about the opponent. The search cost can be seen as an index of the extent of asymmetry in information between the candidates. While a lowering of this cost improves the information content of negative advertising, we show that the bad type has a stronger incentive to engage in search than the good type. Therefore, the expected welfare of the voter is not monotonic in the cost of search. In particular, if a social planner could "select" the cost of search in order to maximize the probability of correct selection, then she would set the cost to zero when the good type is more common and set the cost very high when the bad type is more common. Similarly, the voter's welfare is not monotonic in the payo¤ from winning o¢ ce.
Polborn and Yi (2006, Proposition 4) derive the empirical prediction that there is a positive correlation between the incidence of negative advertising and the probability of victory conditional on going negative. This is due to their assumption that negative advertising is always informative. Taking into account the harmful role of negative advertising, we obtain an overall negative relationship: negative advertising is only sometimes used by the good type to expose the bad candidate, but mostly used by the bad type to "muddle" the debate. However, the point of this paper is that both the incidence and e¢ cacy of negative advertising depends on the many other factors like voter expectations of candidate quality, extent of information asymmetry and the entire pro…le of messages employed in a debate.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the benchmark model in which the candidates are either "good" or "bad" and section 3 characterizes the equilibrium. Section 4 discusses how candidate behavior in the benchmark case changes as the prior belief and the search cost change, and analyses welfare implications. Section 5 presents a few extensions and Section 6 concludes the main body of the paper. Appendix A discusses an extended version of the model with voter inference and a more general type space. Most proofs are in Appendix B.
Basic Model: Binary Types
There are two players: candidates 1 and 2 with a private quality i ; (i = 1; 2) which can be either Good (G) and Bad (B): 7 For both candidates, quality follows a commonly known Bernoulli distribution with the prior probability of a good type 2 (0; 1): The candidates run campaigns (positive or negative) which reveal information to a voter about quality based on which she votes for one of the two. While the voter is not modelled explicitly as a player, her actions based on information revealed through messages are taken into account in the payo¤s arising from candidate actions. In appendix A we show exactly the same conclusions hold when we formally model the voter as a player.
Actions
There are two actions chosen by player i: the message action M i 2 fP; N g and the search action X i 2 fS; N Sg: P denotes a positive campaign message and N denotes a negative message. If player i undertakes action S (search), he gets to know the type of his rival i with certainty. If action N S (no search) is taken, the rival's type is not known. One can think of the search action as being taken before the message action, so that the message can be conditioned on the information obtained through search. But we assume that the search action itself is private, i.e. a candidate cannot detect whether the rival has searched or not. Thus, the search stage and the debate stage can be considered simultaneous from the strategic point of view. Speeches are also, in the same sense, strategically simultaneous: we assume that a candidate cannot condition his speech on the message of the other candidate. 8 The message pro…le is denoted by M = fM 1 ; M 2 g; the search pro…le by X = fX 1 ; X 2 g and the type pro…le by = f 1 ; 2 g: The payo¤ to player i from an action and type pro…le fM; X; g is assumed to be the payo¤ u i (M; ) from debate less the cost of search, which is c 2 (0; ) if X i = S and zero otherwise. Note that search a¤ects the payo¤ from debate only by a¤ecting the private information available to a player. 7 The "quality" of a candidate can be thought of in two ways. In a common values framework where all voters have the same preference, quality captures all characteristics that voters care about. In a private values framework where the two candidates can be assigned two locations on the left-right ideological continuum, quality can simply be thought of as the distance of a candidate from the median voter's ideal point. 8 Since the campaign theme is part of the broader campaign strategy which is determined in advance (rather than tactics which can change as the campaign progresses), the simultaneity of message choice is not too bad an assumption to start with.
The search cost is an index of how easy it is for a candidate to …nd out detailed information about the other candidate: in this sense it measures the extent of asymmetry of information between candidates. Since the payo¤ from winning the debate has been normalized, in e¤ect, c captures the ratio of the actual cost of search to the payo¤ from winning o¢ ce. Thus, an increase in the importance of the contested o¢ ce (with the di¢ culty of …nding information about the rival remaining the same) would imply a drop in search cost. Among other things, we are interested in showing how almost-free information is qualitatively di¤erent from completely free information: therefore we consider low but positive values of c:
Information Revelation Protocol
The voter (judge) selects the winner in the debate after listening to the messages. The actual process of debate is assumed as a protocol which determines how information about candidate types is revealed to the judge depending on the message pro…le. A debate is called fruitful if the messages one candidate goes positive and the other goes negative. We assume that a fruitful debate fully reveals the type of the candidate whose quality is subject to debate, i.e. the candidate using P . If on the other hand, there is cross talk, i.e. if M 1 = M 2 ; no new information is revealed, presumably because the candidates do not coordinate on discussing an issue. One way to see the protocol is to think of the role of campaign themes as "de…ning the debate": the candidates highlight issues which the media then pursues the issue, checking the facts and so forth. 9 The assumptions seem natural if one takes into account the limitations of media space and public attention span. In a fruitful debate only the focal candidate's type is revealed. A candidate found to be good wins and a candidate revealed to be bad loses. If there is cross talk, the winner is chosen randomly with equal probability. Although simplistic, such a passive voter response to debate works for a two-type case because if one candidate is revealed to be good (bad), the other candidate cannot be better (worse). In Appendix A, we show that if we include the voter as a rational player in the game, such "passive" voting strategies considered here arise as equilibrium behavior, and the equilibrium remains unchanged.
Assume that the winner of the debate gets a payo¤ normalized to 2: The utility u i (M; ) from debate is thus given by: u i (P; P; ) = u i (N; N; ) = 1; u i (P; N; G; i ) = u i (N; P; i ; B) = 2; u i (P; N; B; i ) = u i (N; P; i ; G) = 0;
Obviously, the utility from debate satis…es u 1 (M; ) + u 2 (M; ) = 2: The rather extreme assumption that the media reveals the true type of the focal candidate and reveals nothing otherwise is not necessary for the qualitative results of the model to go through. It has been made for technical convenience so as to be able to drive the basic point home without using unnecessary parameters. In section 5:1 we discuss the results in a generalized model where this extreme assumption is relaxed. What we retain throughout the paper is the conditionally veri…able nature of messages, i.e. a claim reveals information with a higher probability if it is faced with a counter-claim. In that section, we use a probabilistic (rather than deterministic) information revelation protocol which assumes that (1) in a fruitful debate, the quality of the focal candidate is revealed with a higher probability than the non-focal one, and (2) the probability that the voter learns neither candidate's type is higher under cross talk than under a fruitful debate.
Incentives
To understand the incentives that such a payo¤ structure creates, it is useful to describe them in a normal form. There are three possible situations, depending on whether a good type faces a good type, a bad type faces another bad type, or whether the two candidates are of di¤erent types. Each case is described in a separate 2 2 matrix, with the row player's payo¤ shown in the matrix.
Suppose for now the candidates knew each other's types. Then they would know which of the above three situations they were in. If a good candidate were facing another good candidate, then it is strictly dominant for both to employ a positive message: both players would want to discuss their own qualities. If a bad candidate were facing another bad one, then again, it is strictly dominant to use a negative message: neither player wants the focus on himself. When a good candidate faces a bad candidate, there is a matching pennies game: the good candidate wants a fruitful debate either about his own quality (P; N ) or about the rival's (N; P ). The bad candidate, on the other hand, wants to induce cross talk by mimicking the good type's message. What makes this game interesting is that there is incomplete information about the rival's type, and each candidate has an incentive to invest in research about the rival's quality.
Alternative interpretation: issue choice
The basic framework discussed in this paper can be applied to debates that are not limited to candidates discussing each others'qualities. For instance, in the context of American politics, one can think of a competition between a Democratic and a Republican candidate where each candidate chooses to argue on one of two issues -say homeland security and redistribution. The former is thought to be a Republican issue while the latter is thought to be a Democratic one. Suppose the Republican candidate knows more about both the costs and bene…ts of homeland security measures, but talks only about the bene…ts while discussing the issue. However, the Democratic candidate can invest in learning about the costs of homeland security measures and highlight them if he decides to discuss the issue. The framework in the paper would be equally applicable to this situation, and would predict, based on actual costs and bene…ts of each policy, which issue would be discussed by each candidate in equilibrium. In particular, a candidate discussing the bene…ts of the issue espoused by his own party would be equivalent to what is positive advertising in the rest of the paper, and likewise, a candidate revealing the costs of the issues espoused by the party of his rival would be equivalent to negative advertising.
Equilibrium and its properties
Each candidate has to decide whether to acquire information and to choose a message conditional on the information acquired (if any). Since a strategy for a player is a map from types to probabilities of each action, the strategy set for a candidate of type should include the following three elements:
1. p( ) : probability of search.
2. q( ) : probability of using message P conditional on not searching 3. r( ; 0 ) : probability of using message P conditional on searching, and discovering the rival candidate to be of type 0
The equilibrium concept considered here is symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Since only symmetric strategy equilibria are considered, the strategies are not indexed by the identity i of the player.
From the previous discussion, we must have r(G; G) = 1 and r(B; B) = 0 (strictly dominant strategies). The remaining elements in the strategy set of a player is the set of probabilities p(G); p(B); q(G); q(B); r(G) and r(B) where, with a slight abuse of notation, r(G) denotes r(G; B) and r(B) denotes r(B; G).
It is useful to de…ne P 0 as the probability of the event that when the two candidates facing each other are of types and 0 respectively, the candidate with type uses message P . Therefore:
Expanding on equation (1); we de…ne:
Lemma 1, which deals with message choice for each type of candidate conditional on available information, brings out the hide and seek nature of the game.
Lemma 1 For 2 fG; Bg, the message choice q( ) conditional on not searching, and the message choice r( ) conditional on …nding the rival type to be di¤erent from own type, is determined as follows:
(a) On …nding the rival to be a bad type, the good type uses a positive message (r(G) = 1) if
and a negative message (r(G) = 0) if BP G > ; where Pr(G) = :
Proof. See Appendix B.
According to Lemma 1; the message choice of a good type depends only on BP G; the probability with which she expects a bad type of the rival to employ the positive message against her. If the bad type goes positive with a high probability, the good type prefers to go negative and expose the bad type, and if the bad type goes negative with a high probability, the good type prefers to go positive and reveal her true type. In the same way, the message of the bad type depends only on GP B; the probability that the good type of the rival uses a positive message against him. The bad type always prefers to avert a fruitful debate with the good type, and therefore tries to mimic her message. As an implication of Lemma 1(a), conditional on not searching, the good type has a strictly dominant message of P if it is the more common type. Similarly, part (b) implies that conditional on not searching, the bad type …nds it strictly dominant to play N if the bad type is more common. In other words,
Proposition 1 demonstrates the equilibrium behavior of candidates. 10 We do not consider the case = c since it is non-generic. In this case, we can have a continuum of equilibria. However, the equilibria discussed in the proposition extended to c ! still exist in the limit c = : The case of = 1 c is not considered due to the same reasons.
(ii) If 2 (c; 1 c); there is a partially separating equilibrium where both types search with positive probability, i.e. p(G) =
The good type employs a positive message when she does not search and a negative message when she searches and …nds the rival to be a bad type, i.e. q(G) = 1; and r(G) = 0: The bad type employs a negative message when he does not search and a positive message when he searches and …nds the rival to be a good type, i.e. q(B) = 0 and r(B) = 1:
(iii) If > 1 c there is a fully pooling equilibrium where both types send the positive message and neither type searches, i.e. p(G) = p(B) = 0; q(G) = q(B) = 1; and (o¤ equilibrium),
Proof. See appendix B. If either type is too rare (when < c or > 1 c), then there is no incentive for search, and each candidate acts as if the rival is of the common type. When < c; the bad type …nds it strictly dominant to use N (by equation (3)).Since is no search, the action of the bad type is predictable, i.e. BP G = 0; and by Lemma 1(a), the good type employs message P: Thus, when expected candidate quality is very low, we have a "competitive" electorate, there is a lot of negative advertising, but the good type can always separate itself from the bad type by ensuring a fruitful debate. At the other extreme, when > 1 c; the good type always uses P (equation (3)), and Lemma 1(b) dictates that then the bad type will use P too, and successfully ensure cross talk. Therefore, when the expected candidate quality is very high, we have a "conservative" electorate, where there is only positive advertising, and it is impossible to distinguish the good type from the bad. Notice that the no-search case demonstrates that the rarer type has the advantage in the hide-and-seek game.
Search is undertaken only when neither type is very rare, i.e. the expected candidate quality is moderate (c < < 1 c). The good candidate always provides arguments supporting himself (positive message) unless he is sure that the rival is a bad type, in which case he tries to expose the rival by going negative. The bad candidate on the other hand has a default message which is negative, but when he is sure that the rival is a good type, he tries to ensure cross talk by defending himself (positive message), hoping that the rival has not searched and is going to employ a positive message too. This equilibrium is supported by the fact that the good candidate searches less frequently than the bad type.
To see the technical intuition for the equilibrium with search, notice that if a candidate were to invest in search with any positive probability, he must play di¤erent actions with di¤erent types of the rival. Since the good type plays P if the rival is also good, he must play N when search reveals the rival to be bad, i.e. r(G) = 0: In the hide-and-seek game with the bad type, the good type does not want to play the same action against the bad type all the time. Hence, the good type plays P conditional on not searching and N conditional on searching and discovering the rival to be bad. Similarly, the bad type has r(B) = 1 and q(B) = 0: The search probabilities are chosen by each type so as to keep the "other" type indi¤erent between searching and not searching: search thus performs the role of mixing between the two di¤erent actions in the debate.
As demonstrated by the above proposition, irrespective of whether search occurs or not, when two good candidates are in competition, there is cross talk with both candidates arguing in support of themselves (positive message). When two bad candidates face each other, we again have cross talk, but with negative messages if < 1 c and with positive messages otherwise: A fruitful debate can occur only between a good and a bad type.
Notice that although we have considered "mechanistic" or passive voting, including the voter as a rational player does not alter this equilibrium. First, note there is nothing more to learn from cross-talk because both candidates take the same action. As long as there is a common prior over both candidates, it is rational for the voter to randomly choose the winner. In equilibrium, fruitful debate occurs only between two di¤erent types of candidates -thus the passive action is again rational. we make the additional assumption that o¤ the equilibrium, if the voter observes a candidate to be of a type that is not supposed to be observed in equilibrium (e.g. type B in the case < c), then the voter assumes that each type of the rival candidate has a small positive probability of having played N; which implies that there remains an uncertainty about the type of the rival. Thus, o¤ the equilibrium path too, the voter strictly prefers to vote for the candidate revealed to be good and against the candidate revealed to be bad. Therefore, the "naive" voting action hardwired in the payo¤s does not change if we include a rational voter in the model. Voter inference is formally discussed in Appendix A.
Properties of Search
A few properties of search are worth mentioning here:
1. Given the equilibrium message strategies, search has the property of strategic substitutability:
certain search by one type takes away the incentive of the other type to search. Moreover, the type that does not search can mix messages in such a way as to nullify the informational advantage of the type that has searched. Therefore, no candidate searches with certainty, even if search cost is very low. The result that search must be probabilistic casts doubt over the assumption of full information between candidates which is common in the related literature. 11 2. Search is reciprocal, i.e. if one type searches with a positive probability, the other type does so too.
3. If search occurs, the bad type searches with a higher frequency than the good type. In the equilibrium with search, we must have p(B) > better information about herself than the bad type has about himself, the marginal value of positive advertising is higher to the good type than the bad. It is this advantage that depresses the good type's incentive to search, and raises the bad type's motivation for the same. This ine¢ ciency due to di¤erent incentives for search is present only when search is worthwhile, and we call it the ine¢ ciency due to search. For a given prior , the size of this ine¢ ciency (measured as the di¤erence between p(G) and p(B)) increases with the cost of search 2 (c; 1 c): Thus, the cost of search drives a wedge between the incentives to search of the two types. To drive the point home further, note that as c ! 0; the ine¢ ciency due to search vanishes in the limit.
4. As the cost of search goes to zero, the outcome of a debate between a good and a bad type approaches that of a matching pennies game, which is a game of complete information. As c ! 0; for any , both p(B) and p(G) approach : Thus, both types mix the positive and negative message almost equally when they face each other. It is as if the good type ignores the uncertainty and takes into consideration only the bad type of the rival and conversely. Even though in equilibrium there is residual incompleteness of information between the two candidates (since search probabilities are close to half), we have the same outcome that would have come about if the only information asymmetry was between the voter and the candidates.
Messages and candidate quality
To analyze what messages mean about candidate quality, one really has to look at the voter as a rational player. We have informally discussed before and formally demonstrated in appendix A that the equilibrium strategies derived earlier in this section can be used to analyze voter inference of candidate types from messages spoken.
The most important issue highlighted in this paper is that information is revealed by the pro…le of messages rather than an individual message. Therefore, the same message may induce very di¤erent inferences about candidate quality depending on the message spoken by the other candidate and on the expected candidate quality. It has already been pointed out a fruitful debate has either a good candidate "exposing" a bad one, or a good candidate successfully defending herself against "slander"by a bad one. Thus, if in a debate a candidate is revealed to be good, the other type must be bad, and vice versa. In case of cross talk, the candidates mimic each other's message. Since the type of both candidates is drawn from a common prior distribution, the voter cannot distinguish between the two, and assigns to each candidate a common, updated posterior distribution of types. When there is cross talk with positive messages, either or both of the candidates must be good. This implies that when there is cross talk with a positive message, the voters would adjust their quality assessment of candidates upwards from the prior. Similarly, when there is cross talk with negative messages, at least one of the two candidates is bad, and voters adjust their assessment downwards. Suppose both candidates cross talk with message M;and the inferred probability of the candidates being good be b (M ). A comparison of the posterior b (M ) with the prior allows us to draw several conclusions about the "meaning" of messages to the electorate.
1 . If 2 (c; 1 c), then b (N ) < ; i.e. the assessment of candidate quality goes down when the voters observe both candidates attacking each other in the debate. In fact, the voters believe that the candidates are more likely to be bad than good, i.e. b (N ) < 
Comparative Statics
In this section, we examine the comparative static properties of the equilibrium for di¤erent levels of the search cost and average candidate quality, and discuss the implications of such properties.
Welfare Analysis: Candidate Selection
Looking at political campaigns as debates between candidates with partial information about each other helps us understand a few important issues about the e¢ ciency of the campaign process especially in terms of its ability to select the better candidate. The major …nding of the model is that as the prior probability of a candidate being good increases, the probability of a good candidate being selected through the electoral process may actually go down. Figure 1 plots the total probability of selection of the good candidate against the prior for some given search cost c 12 : In the graph, there exist downward jumps in otherwise piecewise continuous and monotonically increasing graphs. There are three regimes based on ranges of : full separation, partial separation and no separation, and the downwards jumps occur when we move from a more e¢ cient regime 12 Denote the total probability of selection of the good type given c and as f c ( ): It can be deduced from Propositions 1 that:
to a less e¢ cient one as the average candidate quality increases. Note also that since an increase in the search cost favours the bad type, the downward jumps are larger as the cost of information increases. The total probability of selection may not fully re ‡ect the e¢ ciency of debate as a selection mechanism. Perhaps a better indicator of the e¢ ciency of debates in selecting the right candidate would be a measure of how often the good candidate wins when competing against a bad candidate. Hence we look at the equilibrium probability of a fruitful debate conditional on candidates being of di¤erent types. Denote this probability ( ; c): Proposition 2 shows how changes with the parameters of the model. Proposition 2 Suppose one of the two competing candidates is a good type and the other is a bad type. Debate is always fruitful if < c; never fruitful if > 1 c; and if 2 (c; 1 c) debate is fruitful with a probability ( ; c) = 
Proof. Follows from proposition 1. When there is no search, the rarer type has full advantage in the hide and seek game. For very low priors, debate is fully e¢ cient and for very high priors, debate is fully ine¢ cient. When the prior is moderate, both types search in equilibrium. In the case when the search cost is very low, i.e. c ! 0; the debate between the good and bad types reduces to the matching pennies game in which there is no advantage to either type: hence each message pro…le occurs with equal probability. Then ( ; c) ! for almost all values of the prior. As the search cost increases, there is a further ine¢ ciency due to di¤erential incentives for search that the two types have. This ine¢ ciency due to search leads to a further welfare loss of ; we unambiguously improve welfare by reducing c, and the best choice of c would be as close to zero as possible. On the other hand, if the bad type is more common, there are two opposing e¤ects. When c < ; a marginal reduction in c reduces the ine¢ ciency due to search and increases . On the other hand, for any given less than ; if we set c > ; we get full separation of types. Hence, if the bad type is more common, a social planner can achieve full separation by su¢ ciently reducing the prize from o¢ ce.
Negative Advertising
Next, we look at the type of messages exchanged in the debate as the prior varies. As the average candidate quality improves, the ex-ante probability that a candidate will play a negative message goes down:In general, the bad type's propensity to attack goes down as the probability of the rival being good goes up. For moderate values of the prior, the volume of negative messages decreases with because the good type's increasing aggressiveness (in searching and attacking the bad type) is more than compensated by the bad type's increasing conservatism (in searching and sending positive messages). This is illustrated in …gure 3 and stated in Remark 1, which follows from Proposition 1. 13 The probability of a negative message ( ; c) is: ( ; c) = Remark 1 The probability of negative advertising is strictly decreasing in the prior for < 1 c and is equal to 0 for > 1 c. Negative advertising is more frequent than positive advertising if the bad type is more common, and less frequent if the good type is more common.
Slander
Slander is de…ned as an attack on the rival in the debate without …nding out information about him.
14 Slander may save the cost of searching, but if by mistake one attacks a good type who successfully defends herself, then one loses the election. One major …nding of the model is that such a risk is taken only by the bad type. Just like negative advertising, the incidence of slander goes down as the prior improves. 15 If < c, since search is too expensive to undertake, all messages of the bad type are slanderous. The probability of slander decreases with improvement in expected candidate quality because the bad type becomes less common and also starts searching more often. For high values of the prior, there is no negative advertising and therefore, no slander. Note that a "clean" electorate in this sense is very ine¢ cient in terms of candidate selection. As the expected candidate quality improves, a growing share of negative advertising is informed attacks by the good type. Thus, not only the absolute volume of slander, but also the share of slander in all negative messages exhibits a decreasing trend with the prior.
Extensions
Although the hide and seek framework discussed in the paper is very simple, it can serve as a legitimate model of electoral competition. This framework can be extended to discuss several 14 Slander may also be de…ned in this model as simply an attack on a good type. With that de…nition, all qualitative statements about slander made in the remark are true. However, since there is no pre-de…ned "good" type in a continuous type model, we cannot carry over this de…nition to the next section. 15 The probability of slander is 1 for < c; features necessary for a richer model of politics.
Probabilistic Information Revelation
Consider a generalization of the model discussed in section 2 and 3 where the quality of the candidate is revealed to the voter with a probability dependent on the pro…le of messages. Suppose the revelation of a candidate's quality is a Bernoulli random variable distributed independently conditional on the message pro…le. If both candidates employ positive messages, each candidate's quality is revealed to the voter with probability P ; and similarly, with probability N if both engage in negative advertising. If, on the other hand, one candidate employs a positive message and the other a negative message, then the former candidate's type is revealed with probability P and the latter's type with probability N : we call this structure the "probabilistic information revelation protocol". we make two assumptions on the parameters:
(A1) captures the fact that in a fruitful debate, the quality of a focal candidate is revealed with a higher probability than that of the non-focal candidate, and (A2) says that the probability that the voter learns nothing is lower in a fruitful debate than in cross talk. First, we demonstrate that under a probabilistic information revelation protocol, these two assumptions preserve the incentive structure in the basic framework. If the types of both candidates are revealed, the voter compares the two and decides. If only one type is revealed, the voter votes for the candidate if he is revealed to be good and against him if he is revealed to be bad. If neither type is revealed, the voter votes randomly. In the notation used in section 2, the payo¤ to the candidates from each message pro…le when the two candidates are of the same type are as follows:
where k = P N +(1 P )(1 N )+2 P (1 N ) = 1+( P N ); and similarly, m = 1 ( P N ): Notice that assumption (A1) implies (and is implied by) 1 < k 2 and 0 < m 1: This ensures that when a good type meets another good type, both …nd it strictly dominant to use a positive message; and when a bad type meets another bad type, both …nd it strictly dominant to use negative messages. Next, consider the game between a good type and a bad type, where we can …nd the payo¤s in the individual cells through a little algebra.
where
Assumption (A2) is equivalent to b > max(a 1 ; a 2 ); which induces the matching pennies structure: Therefore, when a good type faces a bad type, the former prefers fruitful debate (unmatched messages) and the latter prefers cross talk (matched messages).
The following proposition describes the equilibrium in the probabilistic revelation case. Under two additional restrictions, the features of the equilibrium are exactly the same as those in the deterministic revelation case. In fact, proposition 1 is a special case of proposition 4.
Proposition 3 Assume (A1); (A2) and c <
The following is the equilibrium for di¤erent values of the prior :
there is a fully separating equilibrium with no search, i.e. p(G) = there is a fully pooling equilibrium on the positive message and neither type searches, i.e. p(G) = p(B) = 0; q(G) = q(B) = 1; and (o¤ equilibrium), r(G) = 0; r(B) = 1:
We skip the proof of this proposition as it is similar to the proof of proposition 1.
Continuous Type Space
To discuss the continuous type extension we need to formally include the voter as a third player in the game and discuss his beliefs given candidate strategies and revealed information. In Appendix A, we discuss voter beliefs and then show that there is an equilibrium in the continuous type case where there is a cut-o¤ quality such that candidates with their type above the cut-o¤ behave like the good type in the baseline (two-type) model, and those with type below the cut-o¤ behave like the bad type. Therefore, all results in the baseline model carry over. Moreover, we get an endogenous classi…cation of the continuum of quality into "good" and "bad", dictated by voter beliefs. The results are presented for the deterministic information revelation protocol, but we believe that similar results can be derived for the probabilistic revelation too.
The continuous type extension is not of mere technical interest. It provides a comparison with the existing literature on adverse selection with one principal (the median voter) and two competing agents (the candidates). Banks (1990) analyses Downsian competition where candidates may make false announcements about their preferred positions, but lying has an exogenous cost that increases in the distance between their preferred and announced positions. While Banks …nds pooling of candidate types over an interval containing the median voter's best point, Callander and Wilkie (2007) show that if there is a cheap talking type in the model, pooling happens at two disjoint intervals on either side of the median voter's best point. Thus, the "best" types (those that are preferred most by the median voter) pool in the former paper while the "moderate" types pool in the latter, and all the other types separate. The continuous type space in this model can be interpreted as a space of possible candidate locations on the Hotelling line, with higher quality implying a location closer to the median voter's ideal point. In the equilibrium in the current model there are two clusters of pooling -one for the "good" types and the other for the "bad" types. The message in this paper is that if competition reveals information about only one agent, it is possible to separate the good set of types from the bad set of types (where good and bad types are de…ned endogenously), but one cannot separate within the good or bad set of types.
Incumbency Advantage
The debates framework can be extended to examine the incumbency advantage. According to this model, the source of the advantage is the ability to alter voters' perceptions. Suppose the incumbent has successfully been able to raise the prior probability of being good to I ; which is higher than the prior C from which the challenger is drawn. If 0 < C < I < 1; then in equilibrium, the good type of the incumbent always employs a positive message, the bad type of the challenger always goes negative. The bad type of incumbent mixes through search, imitating the good type partially. Similarly, the good type of the challenger mixes, unable to separate himself from the bad type fully. The good type of the incumbent always wins. The bad type of the incumbent sometimes wins against the good type of challenger.
Conversely, if the incumbent is assessed to be worse than the average challenger ( C > I ), then the incumbent always loses to the good type of the challenger. Even the good type of the incumbent may lose to the bad type of the challenger. Thus, the voter rewards good performance and punishes bad performance of the incumbent. Note that this result hinges on observability and not on risk aversion of the voter. If the voter is risk averse, then the incumbent can have an advantage over the challenger even if he performs somewhat badly, since his quality would be known with more certainty than that of the challenger. This analysis indicates that the whole objective of political activity is to alter voters'expectation of candidate quality before the actual campaign begins.
Conclusion
This paper examines the choice between positive and negative campaigns as a particular case of the more general decision problem of contradicting the opponent's argument (revealing information through fruitful debate) and mimicking his argument (concealing information through cross talk). The fundamental idea of the paper is that information transmitted in a debate is conditionally veri…able: the truth of an argument is more transparent when compared with a counter-argument. Using this model, most of the results in the existing literature on positive and negative advertising are con…rmed, and additionally, issues like lies and slander are explained. The model points out that a lie or slander, while useless to the voter, might be useful to the candidate in "muddling"the debate and thus distracting the attention of the electorate. The model also shows that, contrary to popular perception, voter welfare is not monotonic in the expected candidate quality.
The existing body of empirical and experimental work investigating the role of attack messages has largely proved inconclusive in establishing whether such messages are bene…cial or harmful. The current paper suggests that perhaps e¤orts to classify negative messages in such exclusive categories might be misdirected. We might need to take into account the entire pro…le of messages in order to set up the right hypotheses to test with …eld or laboratory data.
Last but not the least, the paper also suggests a new reason why advertisements for experiential goods are believed, at least partially. The current paper points out that since each advertiser's willingness to misinform is potentially checked by the ability of his competitor to inform, advertisements can be treated as partially credible signals of the private information of the sponsor. These contributions, we believe, would make the paper independently interesting to those not actively engaged with the literature on positive and negative advertising. In the main body of the paper, the voter is treated as "passive" . In this section, we include a rationally updating voter and a more general space of types. Consider a game G( ; F; c) with a voter and two candidates i = 1; 2: Each candidate has a private quality type i that is drawn from a common type space R according to a common distribution F ( ): The action space of candidates i = 1; 2 is exactly the same as speci…ed in Section 2. Formally, this is a three stage game. In stage 1, the candidates observe their own realized type and choose search action X privately: In stage 2, the candidates play debate action M 2 fP; N g: Since action in stage 1 is private, stages 1 and 2 are considered strategically simultaneous. The (deterministic) information revelation protocol is now formally introduced as a function R : M 2 ! [ , which has the following form R(P; P; ) = R(N; N; ) = R(P; N; ) = 1 and R(N; P; ) = 2
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In stage 3; the voter observes R(M; ) = 2 [ and votes for either candidate, and the utilities are realized. Assume that if the winning candidate's type is ; the voter receives a utility of : The voter's action is v i ( ); which is the probability of voting for candidate i: Assuming that the voter votes for both candidates with the same probability whenever he is indi¤erent, we have
; 1g: The utility of candidate i from debate is u i (M; ) = 2 v i ( ); i = 1; 2: The total utility of the candidate, as before, is the utility from winning the debate less the search cost c 2 (0; 1 2 ). Our equilibrium concept is symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Voter and candidate strategies
In the game G, the voter rationally forms beliefs about candidate types based on information and M: However, the structure of the game is such that the only thing that matters for ranking the candidates is and not M: Suppose the expected type of candidate i is ( i j ): Since this is also the expected utility from a candidate when he is elected, the voter compares ( 1 j ) and ( 2 j ) and votes for whichever is higher. If they are equal, the voter randomizes with equal probability. If = ; both candidates are playing the same action. Since the candidates are playing symmetric strategies, the voter cannot distinguish between the two. Hence, ( 1 j ) = ( 2 j ); and therefore v i ( ) = : If = i ; the type of candidate i is known to be i while ( i j i ) is inferred by the voter either by Bayes Rule from equilibrium strategies or by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Hence, the called rational voting strategies are:
The strategy space is de…ned by the functions p( ); q( ) and r( ; 0 ) as mentioned in section 3:
Note that this set-up can handle any type space of reasonable generality. First, consider a binary type space.
Binary Type space
Suppose that there are only two types: Good (G) and Bad (B). In formal terms, = fG; Bg; where G and B are two real numbers with G > B: The distribution F ( ) now becomes Bernoulli, with the prior Pr( i = G) = 2 (0; 1) for i = 1; 2: It is shown here that for a natural speci…cation of out-of-equilibrium beliefs, the game G(fG; Bg; ; c) has the same unique equilibrium as the game H( ; c) discussed in the main body of the paper 16 . To demonstrate that, we show that for game G(fG; Bg; ; c), rational voting strategy is the same as passive voting strategy considered in H, and therefore leads to the same outcome. De…ne passive voting strategy as
Assume that if i 2 fG; Bg is revealed out of equilibrium in a debate, then the voter assumes that both types G and B of candidate i have small positive probabilities G and B of having deviated and played N: This implies that o¤ the equilibrium path,
Next, note that in game H; for action pro…les that constitute the equilibrium, whenever any type of candidate i is revealed, there is a positive probability of both types G and B of candidate i to have attacked candidate i: Hence, along the equilibrium path too, by Bayes rule, we must have condition (5) satis…ed: The next Lemma established this fact more generally for the game G(fG; Bg; ; c) :
Lemma 2 In the game G(fG; Bg; ; c); there is no symmetric equilibrium where for some type i 2 fG; Bg; we have ( i j i ) = i :
Proof. In Appendix B.
From Lemma 3, we have for any equilibrium strategy pro…le of the game G(fG; Bg; ; c)
(5) and (6) imply that if = fG; Bg; we must have
From (4); the rational voting strategy supporting any equilibrium of G; on and o¤ the equilibrium path, is:
Hence, passive voting is rational here. Therefore, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Given the out-of-equilibrium beliefs stated in (5) ; the solution to G(fG; Bg; ; c) is the same as the solution to the game H( ; c):
Continuous Type Space
This section demonstrates that all the results proved in the case of the binary type space extend naturally to a case where quality can vary over a continuum. Moreover, the continuum breaks into a "good" set and a "bad" set endogenously.
Normalize the type space and consider it to be the unit interval [0; 1]: Suppose F ( ) is a non-atomic prior distribution from which is drawn. Assume that F ( ) has full support over . Note that voter inference in this case is non-trivial. If some candidate is revealed to be of type 2 (0; 1); then the attacker potentially can be of a type that is strictly better, equal or strictly worse. In the two-type model, both types were extreme -and therefore revelation of one type was enough for the voter to decide. What is interesting is that in the continuous model too, there is a class of equilibria in which rational voting looks very much like passive voting.
The strategy functions p( ); q( ) and r( ; 0 ) are de…ned in the same way as in Section 3; except that these functions are now probability density functions -assume them to be continuous except at a …nite number of points. Next, de…ne h( ; 0 ) as the probability density of the event that conditional on candidates of types and 0 respectively, the one with type employs message P . This is the equivalent of P 0 as de…ned in (1) in the discrete set-up. Formally,
Using (7); de…ne g( ; 0 ) as the probability density that type is revealed through a fruitful debate against type 0 : In other words, g( ; 0 ) is the probability density of the event that conditional on type facing type 0 , type plays message action P and type 0 plays message N:
Next, de…ne e( ) as the expected type of candidate i when candidate i has been revealed to be of type : Formally, e( ) = ( i j i = ): When a type is revealed in equilibrium with positive probability, using (8); e( ) can be calculated as:
; when
If some type is not revealed in equilibrium with a positive probability, then e( ) has to be determined by an appropriate speci…cation of out of equilibrium beliefs. Signaling games with continuous types often admit multiple equilibria. Both Banks (1990) and Callander and Wilkie (2005) use the re…nement of universal divinity to select equilibria. Here, the main interest is in the link between passive and rational beliefs, and speci…cally in the existence of equilibria that can be supported by passive beliefs. To avoid equilibria that are too dependent on beliefs o¤ the equilibrium path, assume the following restriction on the set of equilibria:
In equilibrium, all types 2 should be revealed with positive probability, i.e.
This guarantees that e( ) is de…ned by (9) for all : Next, separate the type space into disjoint sets G; f M and B such that
Since we are looking for equilibria that are similar to those in the two-type case, consider equilibria where f M is a collection of a …nite number of points, and thus has measure zero. Henceforth, ignore the set f M and look only at G and B: If candidate i is revealed to be of type 2 G; ( i j 2 G) = e( ) < ; implying that the voter will vote in favour of candidate i: Conversely, if candidate i is revealed to have type 2 B; he is voted against. Hence, if there is an equilibrium with restriction (9); it would look like the equilibrium with binary types and passive strategies. Note however that in Section 2, the prior in favour of the good type was exogenous, and in this section the measure of the set G is determined endogenously. Formally, call R
We need to show that in equilibrium, we must have 2 (0; 1): To put more structure on the set of equilibria, consider another restriction. This restriction is not necessary for the existence of binary equilibria with passive voting strategies. However, it selects equilibria among those with such strategies that lead to a "natural" interpretation of good and bad. This is a weaker form of the monotonicity restriction in Polborn and Yi (2006) 17 . De…ne the expected utility in equilibrium for type of player i as U i ( ); and stipulate that in equilibrium a type must not have a strictly greater expected utility than a higher type, i.e.
In the candidate equilibrium, all 2 G and all 2 B play the same strategy, and therefore,
Also, unless there is complete pooling in equilibrium, for any ' 2 G and ' 0 2 B; we must
Therefore, the restriction (11) and conditions (12) imply that for such a candidate equilibrium, if all types do not pool on the same strategy, there must exist some 2 (0; 1) such that
In other words, G = f : > g and B = f : < g: With this de…nition of the sets G and B; there indeed exists a class of equilibria with the requisite properties. Moreover, any number in the range (c; 1 c) can serve as : Proposition 6 is a formal statement of the existence and characterization of equilibria in the continuous type case. It demonstrates that the type space endogenously breaks into two sets which conform to the "natural" de…nition of good and bad, and that the equilibrium with the binary type space is replicated.
Proposition 5 Consider any
2 (c; 1 c); and de…ne sets G and B as in (13) : Then the following is an equilibrium obeying restrictions (10) and (11) :
where, if = 1 F ( ); the quantities p(G); p(B); q(G); q(B); r(G) and r(B) are given by Proposition 1(ii):
The fact that the strategies mentioned in the proposition constitute an equilibrium conforming to the aforementioned restrictions can be easily checked.
This proposition states that there is always a monotonic equilibrium with rational voting that is supported by passive voting strategies. There is a cut-o¤ type above which all types are deemed to be "good" and below which all types are deemed to be "bad". All good types behave like type G in the discrete case, and all bad types behave like type B. The voter simply votes in favour of a candidate if he is revealed to be a good type and against him if he is revealed to be a bad type. Note however that this cuto¤ type is not unique. In fact, any number in the range (c; 1 c) can serve as the cut-o¤ type Thus, it is possible that in two electorates where the prior distributions from which the two candidates are drawn are exactly the same, the de…nition of a good candidate and a bad candidate are di¤erent. Comparative static conclusions are di¢ cult to draw because of the multiplicity of equilibria, but it can be said that the supportable set of cut-o¤ types expands as the search cost decreases.
Appendix B: Proofs
To de…ne the equilibrium strategies in this setting, some basic notation needs to be introduced.
De…ne Eu i (M jp; q; r; I) as the expected utility from debate to type 2 fG; Bg of player i from playing message M 2 fP; N g when player i is using strategies p( ); q( ) and r( ; ); and the information available to the player is I 2 fG; B; g: If there is search and the type of the rival is known then I = G or I = B; else, I = : This expected utility is constructed from the debate payo¤ u i (M; ), taking expectation over the possible messages of the rival (from the strategies) and if the rival type is not known, then over possible types of the rival too.
De…ne as Eu i (mjp; q; r; I) the expected utility when type of player i plays message P with a probability m 2 [0; 1]:
Eu i (mjp; q; r; 0 ) # c as the expected utility from search, taking into account the optimal message choice post search, and taking expectation over rival types and EU i (N S; mjp; q; r) = Eu i (mjp; q; r; ) as the expected utility from not searching and playing a mix m of messages. Equilibrium strategies is a triad of functions fp ( ); q ( ); r ( ; )g for 2 fG; Bg and 0 2 fG; Bg such that:
1. r ( ; 0 ) = arg max pEU i (Sjp ; q ; r ) + (1 p)EU i (N S; q jp ; q ; r ) :
When a candidate of type knows that his rival is also of type ; then the candidate has a strictly dominant message. Denote this message by D( ): Denote by D( ) the other available action in the message space, i.e. D( ) = fP; N gnD( ): In the same way, denote by the type di¤erent from ; i.e. = fG; Bgn :
We shall …rst prove a few results in the form of claims and use those results to …nd the equilibrium strategies for di¤erent parameter values. The above claim establishes that whenever there is search with a positive probability, type uses message D( ) when he knows that the rival is of type : Claims 1 and 2 determine what actions will be played by a type when the rival type is known. Note that the choice of message post search is independent of the strategy of the rival type. Thus, By simple algebra, the above expression equals Pr( )(2 P i 1) c. This claim, along with claim 3, establishes that when there is search by type of player i; we must have Pr( )(2 P i 1) c 0: If there is indi¤erence between search and no search, then the inequality must be satis…ed as an equality. Note that this depends on the strategy of the rival candidate.
Proof of Lemma 1
When the rival is known to be bad, the expected payo¤ of type G from using P is BP G + 2(1 BP G) c; and that from using message N is 2BP G + (1 BP G) c: Thus, the net gain from using P instead of N is (1 2BP G); which is strictly positive if BP G < : This proves the …rst part of (a): When the rival is unknown, the payo¤ to type G from message P is fGP G + 2(1 GP G)g + (1 )fBP G + 2(1 BP G)g and that from playing N is f(1 GP G)g + (1 )f2BP G + (1 BP G)g; and the gain from playing P instead of N is [1 2(1 )BP G] ; and the second part of (a) follows. The proof of (b) is similar. With the four basic claims and Lemma 1, we can …nd the equilibrium, i.e. prove proposition 1. Part (ii): c < < 1 c Here, min( ; 1 ) > c: Therefore, by claim 3, for 2 fG; Bg; EU i (Sjp; q; r) EU i (N S; D( )jp; q; r) > 0: Thus, whenever the action N S is played by type with positive probability, D( ) is the message employed, or p(G) < 1 ) q(G) = 1 and p(B) < 1 ) q(B) = 0
Proof
Next, we claim that we cannot have search with certainty for either type.
Claim 5
We cannot have p( ) = 1 in equilibrium for 2 fG; Bg:
Proof. It has already been established that p( ) = 0 in equilibrium for 2 fG; Bg as long as < c or > 1 c: We need to prove this claim only for the case c < < 1 c: Suppose c < < 1 c and p(G) = 1 for i: Therefore, GP B i = r(G); and by Claim 2, r(G) = 0: This implies by Lemma 1(b) that for i; r(B) = q(B) = 0 ) BP G i = 0 (by Lemma 1) . Using this
